Russia cracks down on telephones, social media as Putin prepares one other army draft
KYIV, Ukraine — The Kremlin has been quietly tightening its control over phones, internet access and social media across Russia for months in a move insiders say is aimed at quashing dissent ahead of another possible military call-up.
Rumors of a new mobilization wave have circulated across Telegram channels, pro-war blogs and among Ukrainian and Western analysts who monitor communications inside Russia.
The speculation has intensified as Russian President Vladimir Putin has offered new evidence that he is committed to a long war in Ukraine.
The Russian leader on Wednesday signed a decree expanding the size of Russia’s armed forces to nearly 2.4 million personnel, including roughly 1.5 million active-duty troops, according to Russian government documents reported by multiple outlets.
The move marks the latest in a series of increases since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2022.
Publicly, Moscow has repeatedly denied plans for another mass call-up, wary of the backlash triggered by its partial mobilization in September 2022. But as the full-scale war in Ukraine grinds on into its fifth year and battlefield casualties mount, analysts say the Russian army faces mounting manpower pressure.
“There are rumors that Putin might call for a new wave of mobilization,” said James Rushton, a British military analyst who closely tracks Russian losses and recruitment trends. “I don’t know how accurate those rumors are, but it’s definitely within the realm of possibilities.”
Telegram, rumors and control
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As speculation about mobilization mounts, the Kremlin has moved aggressively to tighten its grip on social media, particularly Telegram.
Founded by Russian-born entrepreneur Pavel Durov, the messaging platform has quickly become one of the most influential social media networks in Russia and across the post-Soviet world.
While the app — used daily by 60 million Russians — has proven useful for Kremlin officials to propagate pro-war narratives, it has also allowed Russian soldiers, military bloggers and politically engaged citizens to share much more clear-eyed assessments of the situation on the battlefield.
In February, Russia’s media regulator Roskomnadzor announced new restrictions and fines targeting Telegram, accusing the company of failing to comply with Russian law.
The agency said Telegram did not adequately protect personal data or prevent its use for “criminal and terrorist purposes,” adding that further restrictions could follow.
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Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov publicly criticized Telegram for failing to observe Russian law while urging users to migrate to a state-backed alternative known as MAX, which officials describe as a “national messenger.”
Security officials escalated the rhetoric further. Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov accused Mr. Durov of acting in “mercenary interests” and claimed foreign intelligence services could access users’ messages.
Telegram rejected the accusations, calling them a fabrication intended to justify pushing citizens onto a state-controlled platform designed for surveillance and censorship.
The crackdown has triggered backlash, including from pro-war bloggers and soldiers who rely on Telegram for battlefield updates, coordination and fundraising. Complaints from frontline voices have described throttling of the app as damaging to operational effectiveness.
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For analysts, the timing is telling.
Some Russian commentators openly speculate that tighter control over Telegram is meant to limit public reaction to unpopular decisions — including potential manpower measures — by restricting the platforms where rumors, criticism and draft-evasion advice spread fastest.
The assessment is shared by the Washington-based think tank Institute for the Study of War, which wrote in late February that “the Kremlin may be accelerating its internet censorship campaign now in order to preempt domestic backlash”.
Mobilization, unspoken
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Since the political shock of 2022, Russian authorities have avoided announcing another sweeping mobilization decree.
In September 2022, Mr. Putin ordered what the Kremlin called at the time a “partial mobilization” of 300,000 reservists to stabilize the front in Ukraine after heavy losses and battlefield setbacks.
The announcement — the first such mobilization in Russia since World War II — triggered protests in dozens of cities and prompted a mass exodus from Russia of military-age men, with hundreds of thousands leaving the country to avoid being drafted.
Since then, the Kremlin has relied on contract recruitment, financial incentives, coercive pressure on men of military age and the continued use of prisoners and foreign recruits.
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At the same time, lawmakers have reshaped the legal and administrative architecture of conscription itself.
Recent legislation allows conscription offices to operate year-round, streamlining paperwork and enforcement even outside traditional draft windows.
Russia has also introduced a centralized digital draft registry enabling authorities to issue summons electronically and restrict travel, banking access or vehicle registration for those who fail to comply.
Officially framed as modernization, these measures significantly lower the threshold for rapid call-ups if the Kremlin chooses to proceed. They already allow a form of rolling mobilization without a dramatic public announcement.
Russia has also expanded the use of reservists for “training exercises,” assigning them to guard infrastructure or perform rear-area duties, freeing frontline units for combat.
Such steps fall short of declaring mobilization but blur the line between peacetime conscription and wartime manpower generation.
“There would be a political cost attached to it,” Mr. Rushton said of any formal mobilization order. “Putin might be concerned about public opinion, but he also seems firmly in control of Russian society.”
Losses that drive the rumors
The manpower pressure behind the rumors is rooted in the scale of Russian losses in Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials estimate that Russian casualties — killed, wounded or missing — now exceed one million since February 2022.
While Kyiv’s figures cannot be independently verified in full, Western intelligence assessments broadly support the conclusion that Russian losses have reached historic levels.
British defense intelligence estimates released in late 2025 placed Russian casualties well above one million, with hundreds of thousands believed killed.
Western analysts paint a stark picture of Russia’s campaigns in 2025, underscoring the limited territorial gains relative to staggering personnel losses.
According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces seized roughly 4,669 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory between January and December 2025 — an incremental advance compared with the scale of the conflict.
Meanwhile, assessments based on a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis indicate Russian military casualties could total nearly 1.2 million killed, wounded or missing since the invasion began in 2022, including roughly 425,000 casualties in 2025 alone.
Analysts argue these figures suggest Moscow is absorbing extraordinary human costs for modest battlefield progress — a dynamic that strains recruitment and fuels speculation about future mobilization.
“The growing use of foreign fighters, especially from Africa, might point to problems in recruitment,” Mr. Rushton said. “And to the fact that the financially motivated recruits might have started to dry up.”
Russia has offered lucrative signing bonuses and regional benefits to attract volunteers, but Mr. Rushton says the pool of willing recruits is narrowing.
“There’s a sense that the low-hanging fruits are gone,” he said. “And so they have to turn to other countries.”
Territorial gains at a high price
Moscow continues to highlight battlefield advances as proof that its strategy is working. Russian officials and pro-war commentators frequently cite the capture of Ukrainian towns as evidence of momentum.
“They would point to the capture of Pokrovsk as their main win of 2025,” Mr. Rushton said. “However, the fact that it took so long and that they had so many casualties to take it are not signs of strength.”
Western analysts increasingly echo that assessment, noting that Russia’s advances often come at disproportionate human cost.
While the Kremlin can obscure casualty figures domestically, the effects are felt across recruitment pipelines.
“While it’s hard to assess the casualties, there are signs of unsustainability in Russian recruitment,” Mr. Rushton said.
A controlled war narrative
Russian officials continue to insist there is no plan for a new mobilization wave.
Technically, they may be telling the truth. Under the current system, a formal decree is no longer required to significantly increase manpower intake.
Incremental measures can achieve similar results while reducing political risk, and information control plays a central role in that strategy.
Any large-scale mobilization — declared or undeclared — risks public anxiety, renewed emigration and even protests.
By constraining Telegram and other social platforms, the Kremlin could limit the speed and scale at which such reactions spread.
As Russia prepares for a prolonged war, the combination of heavy casualties, strained recruitment and tightening information control suggests a leadership intent on sustaining the fight while keeping society on a short leash.

