U.S. Air Force runways in Asia are extremely weak to Chinese missile strikes, examine concludes
Chinese missile attacks on Air Force runways at bases in the Indo-Pacific region would severely limit U.S. military power in a future regional conflict, according to a report by military researchers made public Thursday.
Key U.S. air bases in Japan and elsewhere in the region until recently were safe havens from enemy attack and provided rapid power projection with airstrikes for more than three decades, the report by the Stimson Center said.
“That sanctuary age has now ended, and nowhere more than in the Indo-Pacific,” the report warns. “China has invested heavily in building a large and sophisticated arsenal of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that can reach U.S. bases across the region.”
Chinese military strategists view American air power as weakest in forward air bases and, in particular, they understand that runways cratered from missile strikes would prevent warplanes and support aircraft from taking off and landing during critical time periods in a conflict. The report concludes that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) precision missile strikes on runways and taxiways in the region would allow the Chinese military to gain air superiority, a key advantage in war.
The danger was highlighted in May by 13 members of Congress who wrote to Air Force and Navy leaders urging construction of hardened aircraft shelters at bases in the Indo-Pacific region. “The time to act is now,” the Republican members stated.
The Stimson report said recommendations to harden shelters and bunkers are not enough and described vulnerable base runways as an Achilles’ heel for the Air Force. Stimson researchers conducted simulations that modeled the impact of repeated Chinese missile strikes on runways and taxiways in Japan, Northern Marianas, and other Pacific islands.
The study concluded that the missile attacks would close runways and taxiways for days and even weeks in the early days of a conflict.
“These attacks could prevent the U.S. Air Force from conducting fighter operations for about the first 12 days of a conflict from U.S. air bases in Japan and nearly two days from U.S. bases in Guam and other Pacific locations at the outset of war,” the report said.
China’s missile forces have greatly expanded as Beijing prepares to either pressure Taiwan into capitulating to mainland annexation or to be ready to use force to take the island. Tensions also remain high in the South China Sea with Chinese naval and coast guard provocations against Philippines and against Japanese forces in the East China Sea.
In addition to preventing warplane operations, vital aerial refueling tanker and transport flights would be disrupted in Japan for over a month and for half a week at other bases from the runway strikes on bases. Yokota Air Base is the Air Force’s key strategic military hub, located in central Japan west of Tokyo.
The lack of aerial refueling tankers would reduce the effectiveness of many fighter U.S. aircraft, including the most modern F-35s, and damaged runways also would force U.S. bombers to operate much further away from bases in Australia, Hawaii or Alaska at the start of a conflict, the report said. The disruptions would add hours to flight times and substantially reduce daily bomber sorties.
“Addressing this threat to U.S. air bases is arguably the most critical and daunting task facing the U.S. Air Force today,” the report said. “The Air Force finds itself in danger of operating much less effectively than previously assessed, if at all, at the start of a military conflict when the joint force would expect it to quickly set up a combat air patrol or sink Chinese ships in the Taiwan Strait.”
Even worse, PLA war planners could calculate they have a window of over 30 days during which U.S. air power would be sidelined to conduct lightning attacks, such as an invasion of Taiwan.
An Air Force spokeswoman declined to comment on the report. She referred to a September speech by Air Force Gen. Kevin Schneider, commander of the Pacific Air Force, who said his main worry is “ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and nuclear rhetoric.”
The Air Force has adopted a new operating strategy called agile combat employment the seeks to disperse forces from main operating bases “for survival.”
“We then quickly reaggregate our forces for lethality, in the time and place of our choosing, and deliver effects,” Gen. Schneider said. Adm. Sam Paparo, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has said delaying a rapid Chinese attack on Taiwan is a key priority.
He has adopted what is called a “hellscape” strategy of using thousands of uncrewed weapons — both aerial and maritime — to delay Chinese forces until reinforcements arrive.
“If Beijing concludes that it can win a quick and easy military victory, its actions could become very hard to deter,” the report said.
U.S. military countermeasures of dispersing aircraft to reserve bases and civilian airfields, improving rapid runway repair and building more missile defenses will not be enough to open stalled tanker operations.
The report recommends a new Air Force strategy that would shift the role of gaining air superiority to regional allies and partners and relying more on precision weapons strikes. U.S. allies also should do more to build up their air power with more drones and missiles to blunt Chinese attacks early in a conflict without relying on massive U.S. fighters and bombers.
“Above all, American political and military leaders — as well as the American public — should be under no illusions: there will be no refuge or rest from the long reach of Chinese missiles for U.S. air bases in a war,” the report said.
The 68-page report, “Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to U.S. Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific,” was written by Stimson researchers Kelly A. Grieco, Hunter Slingbaum, and Jonathan M. Walker.
